1
 The
political
power
of
sexual
preference

    

    Abstract:
One's
choice
of
sexual
partner
may
be
more
a
political
power
than
a
personal
privilege.
For
other
people's
 actions,
when
those
actions
are
informed
by
their
benign
sexual
attraction
to
us,
constitute
a
social
basis
of
our
self‐ respect.
This
fact
grounds
a
responsibility,
falling
disproportionately
on
each
member
of
a
privileged,
dominant
social
 group,
 first,
 to
 introspect
 and,
 second,
 to
 divest
 himself
 of
 any
 sexual
 aversion
 to
 members
 of
 a
 stigmatized,
 subordinate
 social
 group
 he
 might
 find
 himself
 to
 have.
 Neither
 the
 nature
 nor
 the
 origin
 of
 sexual
 preferences
 renders
them
inscrutable
to
introspection.
For
it
is
their
capacity
to
influence
action
that
makes
sexual
preferences
 morally
 salient;
 and
 to
 claim
 that
 sexual
 preferences
 are
 unchosen
 would
 be
 to
 undermine
 the
 ability
 of
 those
 preferences
to
ground
the
self‐respect
of
the
person
who
is
sexually
preferred.
For
its
part,
the
duty
to
divest
oneself
 of
 a
 sexual
 aversion
 to
 members
 of
 a
 stigmatized,
 subordinate
 group,
 first,
 does
 not
 require
 the
 adoption
 of
 any
 corollary
sexual
attraction
to
them;
second,
is
not
impugned
by
the
possibility
that
members
of
the
dominant
group
 might
divest
themselves
of
a
sexual
aversion,
only
to
replace
it
with
a
sexual
indifference;
and,
third,
does
not
require
 the
impossible,
since
an
individual
has
a
right
against
the
rest
of
society
to
provide
him
with
real
means
of
divesting
 himself
of
a
sexual
aversion
that
threatens
to
maintain,
aggravate,
or
rekindle
stigmatization
in
his
society.

    
    

    
    
 How
 should
 one
 choose
 one’s
 friends?
 How
 should
 one
 choose
 one’s
 lovers?
 How
 should
 one
 choose
 one’s
 life
 partner?
 To
 many,
 perhaps
 to
 most,
 these
 questions
 will
 seem
out
of
place.
There
is
no,
they
will
say,
right
or
wrong,
about
the
way
in
which
one
 chooses
the
people
with
whom
one
will
spend
one’s
time,
and
even
less
so
the
people
 with
whom
one
will
share
one’s
body
or
spend
one’s
life.
Such
questions
are
personal,
 and
thus
beyond
the
reach
of
public
scrutiny.

 
 I
argue,
however,
that
one’s
apparently
personal
choices
of
friends,
sexual
partners,
and
 life‐partner
may
be
more
political
than
we
might
otherwise
like
to
think.
I
focus
on
the
 choice
of
sexual
partner,
since
the
physical
intimacy
of
sexual
intercourse
is
what
many
 of
us
think
of
as
the
quintessence
of
the
exclusively
personal
sphere.
If
my
argument
is
 successful
here,
I
believe
it
will
also
be
successful
with
regard
to
one’s
choice
of
friends
 and
 of
 life‐partners.
 However,
 if
 my
 argument
 is
 not
 successful
 with
 regard
 to
 one’s

    
    *

    
    

    
    

    
    

    
    

    
    *

    
    

    
    

    
    

    
    

    
    *

    
    2
 choice
of
sexual
partners,
I
do
not
believe
that
this
will
necessarily
impugn
the
success
 of
a
similar
argument
limited
to
one’s
choice
of
friends
or
of
life‐partner.

 
 I
focus
on
sexual
preferences
that
are
aversions1
of
a
member
of
a
group
dominant
in
 society
 to
 members
 of
 a
 group
 subordinate
 and
 stigmatised
 in
 that
 society.
 Stigmatisation,
 as
 I
 shall
 understand
 it,
 is
 the
 unwarranted
 public
 representation
 of
 a
 particular
type
of
person
as
being
an
object
worthy
of
the
attitude
of
aversion.
I
argue
 for
 three
 theses.
 First,
 one’s
 capacity
 as
 a
 sexual
 being
 for
 affirming
 the
 sexual
 attractiveness
of
another
sexual
being
is
a
significant
political
power,
since
it
can,
if
you
 are
 a
 member
 of
 the
 dominant
 group,
 contribute
 to
 the
 deconstruction
 of
 an
 unjust
 publicly
 affirmed
 narrative
 that
 members
 of
 the
 subordinate
 group
 are
 worthy
 of
 the
 attitude
 of
 sexual
 aversion.
 Second,
 a
 member
 of
 the
 dominant
 group,
 in
 embarking

    1
    
    
I
shall
ignore
sexual
preferences
that
are
attractions
to
a
certain
type
of
people
–
be
that
type
of
people
members
of
 the
dominant
group
in
some
segregated
and
hierarchised
society,
or
members
of
the
stigmatised,
subordinate
group.
 Instead,
I
shall
focus
on
sexual
preferences
that
are
aversions
of
members
of
the
dominant
group
to
members
of
the
 subordinate
 group.
 For,
 on
 the
 one
 hand,
 in
 itself,
 a
 sexual
 attraction
 of
 a
 member
 of
 the
 dominant
 group
 to
 members
of
the
dominant
group
seems
particularly
innocuous,
and,
perhaps,
for
reasons
of
solidarity,
or
of
duty
to
 perpetuate
a
culture,
required.
On
the
other
hand,
a
sexual
attraction
to
members
of
the
subordinate
group
makes
 for
a
more
complicated
analysis,
because
the
act
of
sexual
intercourse
is
either
inherently
one
of
domination,
or
is
at
 least
an
act
upon
which
an
overtone
of
domination
very
often
supervenes.

 
 We
might
view
the
sexual
attraction
of
a
member
of
the
dominant
group
to
members
of
the
subordinate
group
in
one
 of,
at
least,
three
ways.
We
might
view
it,
first,
as
the
desire
to
re‐enact
in
the
private
sphere
the
social
domination
of
 the
public
sphere;
or,
second,
as
the
desire
to
use
social
domination
as
an
exciting
metaphor
for
sexual
domination;
 or
else,
third,
as
the
desire
to
subvert
in
the
private
sphere
the
social
domination
of
wider
society.
The
last
of
these
 three
 looks
 less
 suspect
 than
 the
 first.
 For
 example,
 one
 online
 forum
 on
 “Interracial
 sex”
 carries
 the
 following
 illustration
of
how
some
people
view
the
power
of
a
sexual
attraction
to
a
member
of
the
subordinate
group
for
the
 end
of
subverting
historical
and
contemporary
trends
of
stigmatisation:
“I
myself,
being
a
Palestinian,
find
the
idea
of
 having
 sex
 with
 Israelis
 very
 exciting...
 me
 and
 another
 two
 guys
 literally
 f***ed
 history
 once,
 when
 myself,
 a
 Palestinian,
ended
up
in
bed
with
an
Israeli
Jew
and
his
German
boyfriend!”
 
 However,
the
second
is
a
murky
area
of
grey.
The
metaphorical
use
of
publicly
accepted
stereotypes
(e.g.
that
black
 men
have
big
penises,
or
that
“Asian
babes”
are
compliant)
has
the
potential
to
be
stigmatising
and
so
detract
from
 the
 dignity
 of
 the
 beloved,
 revealing
 the
 dominant
 group
 lover
 sexually
 attracted
 to
 members
 of
 the
 subordinate
 group
to
be
not
so
unlike
to
the
dominant
group
lover
sexually
averse
to
them.
By
contrast
with
all
these,
somewhat
 intractable,
attractions,
the
sexual
aversions
(of
dominant
group
or
subordinate
group
lovers)
from
members
of
the
 subordinate
group
are
more
clearly
liable
to
maintain
or
aggravate
existing
trends
of
stigmatisation
in
society.

 

    
    3
 upon
a
choice
 of
 sexual
partner,
has
 a
moral
duty
to
 look
inside
himself,
 identify,
and
 evaluate
 any
 sexual
 aversions
 he
 may
 have
 to
 members
 of
 some
 subordinate
 group,
 given
a
political
backdrop
of
historical
and
contemporary
stigmatisation
of
members
of
 subordinate
 groups
 –
 a
 backdrop
 against
 which
 those
 very
 attitudes
 of
 aversion
 will
 have
arisen.
Third,
it
is
the
moral
duty
of
a
politically
engaged
citizen
to
divest
himself
of
 any
 sexual
 aversion
 he
 has
 that
 is
 liable
 to
 maintain,
 aggravate
 or
 re‐kindle
 stigmatization
in
his
society.

 
 1. The
(political)
power
of
love
 
 Self‐respect
 –
 a
 person’s
 belief
 in
 her
 own
 value
 –
 is
 “perhaps
 the
 most
 important
 primary
 good”.
 For
 “without
 [self‐respect]
 nothing
 may
 seem
 worth
 doing,
 or
 if
 some
 things
 have
 value
 for
 us,
 we
 lack
 the
 will
 to
 strive
 for
 them”
 (Rawls
 1999:
 386).
 One’s
 belief
in
one’s
own
value
is
a
function
of
one’s
appraisal
that
one’s
plan
of
life
is
worth
 carrying
out,
and
of
one’s
belief
that
one
has
the
capacities
to
realize
this
plan
of
life.
 One’s
 positive
 self‐appraisal
 depends
 upon
 the
 recognition
 of
 other
 people
 that
 one’s
 plan
of
life
is
worth
carrying
out,
and
that,
in
their
eyes,
one
has
the
capacities
to
realize
 it.
In
this
way,
there
are
social bases
to
our
possession
of
self‐respect.

 
 When
other
people
act
upon
a
benign2
sexual
attraction
they
have
to
us,
that
action
of

    
    2
    
    
 Not
 every
 action
 motivated
 by
 sexual
 attraction
 contributes
 to
 the
 sense
 of
 self‐respect
 of
 the
 person
 who
 is
 the
 object
of
that
sexual
attraction.
MacKinnon
(1979)
persuasively
argues
that
men’s
sexual
attraction
to
women
in
the
 work‐place
very
often
detracts
from
a
woman’s
sense
of
self‐respect.
In
employing
the
adjective
“benign”,
I
 aim
to
 exclude
such
cases
as
these
from
the
theory
I
present.

    
    4
 theirs
contributes
to
our
sense
of
self‐respect.
Other
people’s
actions
informed
by
their
 benign
sexual
attraction
to
us
constitute
one
of
the
social
bases
of
self‐respect.
Indeed,
 it
 is
 nonsensical
 to
 think
 that
 we
 could
 ever
 affirm
 our
 own
 sexual
 attractiveness
 in
 a
 vacuum,
in
the
absence
of
other
people’s
affirmation
of
our
sexual
attractiveness.
In
this
 way,
 the
 sense
 of
 self‐respect
 we
 derive
 from
 affirmation
 of
 our
 sexual
 attractiveness
 seems
to
have
a
wholly
social
basis.
Such
action
contributes
to
our
sense
of
self‐respect
 since
 the
 preference
 that
 motivates
 it
 is
 grounded
 in
 an
 admirable
 property
 we
 are
 deemed
 to
 possess.
 To
 know
 that
 another
 person
 loves
 one
 because
 one
 has
 a
 particular
property
can
be,
if
that
property
is
one
that
one
does
in
fact
have,
and
one
 that
 is
 objectively
 valuable,
 or
 else
 valued
 subjectively
 by
 both
 oneself
 and
 that
 other
 person,
a
source
of
self‐respect.
(cf.
Soble
1990:
145‐6.).3
The
approbation
one
obtains
 when
 one
 receives
 affirmation
 of
 one’s
 sexual
 attractiveness
 from
 someone
 whose
 opinion
 we
 value
 (from
 someone,
 that
 is,
 whom
 we
 ourselves
 find
 sexually
 attractive,
 or,
probably
more
likely,
from
someone
whom
our
society
recognizes
publicly
as
being
 sexually
attractive)
is
an
uniquely
crucial
basis
of
our
sense
of
self‐respect.
It
is
uniquely
 crucial,
 since
 the
 goal
of
becoming
 physically
 intimate
with
 a
person
who
 wants
to
be
 physically
intimate
with
you
(or
who
at
least
believes
you
are
someone
with
whom
it
is
 worth
having
physically
intimate
relations)
is
a
fundamental
human
functioning.4

    
    

    
    3
    
    
Even
without
the
sexual
overtones,
such
action
contributes
to
our
sense
of
self‐respect,
cf.
the
sense
of
worth
we
 receive
from
innocent
compliments:
for
instance,
that
felt
by
the
awkward,
spotty
teenager
when
we
compliment
her
 on
her
smile.


 
 4 
Sexual
affirmation
is
one
of
many
ways
in
which
we
can
elicit
the
approval
of
someone,
whose
opinion
we
value,
of
 a
 property
 of
 ours
 that
 we
 ourselves
 find
 admirable.
 We
 could,
 for
 instance,
 win
 the
 gold
 medal
 from
 the
 Olympic
 committee
 upon
 the
 occasion
 of
 our
 coming
 first
 in
 the
 100m
 sprint.
 However,
 unlike
 our
 receipt
 of
 sexual
 affirmation,
our
doing
so
would
not
satisfy
a
universal
and
fundamental
human
functioning.

    
    5
 
 Contrariwise,
when
other
people
act
upon
a
sexual
aversion
they
have
to
us,
that
action
 of
 theirs
 detracts
 from
 our
 sense
 of
 self‐respect.
 Who
 does
 not
 know
 the
 feeling
 of
 unworthiness
 consequent
 upon
 an
 unrequited
 love?
 However,
 that
 sentiment
 alone
 does
not
call
for
justice.
It
is
merely
one
of
the
unfortunate
aspects
of
the
co‐ordination
 problem
that
is
love.
Insofar
as
this
unfortunate
consequence
is
occasional
rather
than
 systematic,
we
have
no
reason
to
regard
it
as
an
injustice.
However,
if
a
society
publicly
 recognizes
 certain
 properties
 as
 being
 those
 that
 are
 admirable
 enough
 to
 elicit
 love
 from
a
lover,
while
publicly
neglecting,5

or
even
publicly
denigrating,
other
properties
in
 this
respect,
claiming
or
suggesting
that
those
properties
are
not
sufficiently
admirable
 to
elicit
love
from
a
lover,
then
those
people
that
do
not
have
the
former
properties,
or
 those
that
have
only
the
latter
properties,
are
unjustly
undermined
in
their
sense
of
self‐ respect.

 
 But
 a
 publicly
 affirmed
 narrative
 of
 sexual
 aversion
 to
 members
 of
 the
 subordinate
 group,
or,
at
least,
of
sexual
attraction
only
to
properties
that
members
of
the
dominant
 group
 have,
 and
 that
 members
 of
 the
 subordinate
 group
 lack,
 can
 only
 stigmatise
 members
 of
 the
 subordinate
 group
 so
 long
 as
 individual
 members
 of
 the
 dominant
 group
 act
 in
 a
 manner
 that
 affirms
 that
 narrative.
 Here
 we
 see
 the
 political
 power
 of

    
    

    
    5
    
    
An
indubitable
example
of
such
a
publicly
affirmed
narrative
is
that
told
by
the
conspicuous
absence
of
black
female
 models
from
the
catwalks
of
the
world
of
fashion.
It
is
as
yet
unclear
whether
Vogue Italia’s
all‐black
edition
of
the
 magazine
 in
 July
 2008
 will
 prove
 a
 short‐lived
 token
 gesture
 or
 an
 irresistible
 challenge
 to
 this
 narrative,
 cf.
 http://www.independent.co.uk/life‐style/fashion/news/black‐is‐finally‐in‐fashion‐at‐vogue‐816213.html.
 

    
    6
 sexual
 preferences.
 One’s
 capacity
 as
 a
 sexual
 being
 for
 affirming
 the
 sexual
 value
 or
 attractiveness
of
another
sexual
being
is
not
merely
–
or
even,
perhaps,
principally
–
a
 personal
privilege;
it
is
a
significant
political
power,
since
it
can,
if
you
are
a
member
of
 the
 dominant
 group,
 contribute
 to
 the
 deconstruction
 of
 a
 publicly
 affirmed
 narrative
 that
members
of
the
subordinate
group
are
worthy
of
the
attitude
of
sexual
aversion.

 
 Why
 does
 the
 burden
 of
 deconstructing
 unjust
 publicly
 affirmed
 narratives
 fall
 disproportionately
 upon
 members
 of
 the
 dominant
 group?
 The
 reason
 is
 that
 one
 can
 have
responsibilities
simply
because
one
happens
to
be
the
person
that
can
best
meet
 those
 responsibilities,
 simply
 because
 one
 is
 in
 the
 right
 place
 at
 the
 right
 time,
 as
 it
 were.
We
show
that
this
is
our
intuition
in
our
introducing
and
maintaining
a
system
of
 progressive
taxation:
in
doing
this
we
demonstrate
that
we
think
the
rich
have
a
special
 responsibility
to
assuage
the
problems
of
the
poor,
even if
it
can
be
established
that
the
 rich
are
in
no
way
the
cause
of
the
poverty
of
the
poor.
Similarly,
given
that
this
political
 power
 to
 contribute
 to
 the
 deconstruction
 of
 an
 unjust,
 publicly
 affirmed
 narrative
 accrues
 to
 a
 person
 only
 if
 that
 person
 is
 a
 member
 of
 the
 dominant
 group,
 it
 is
 members
of
the
dominant
group
who
are
–
fortuitously
–
in
the
best
position
to
assuage
 the
 unjust
 situation
 of
 historical
 or
 contemporary
 stigmatisation.
 For
 this
 reason,
 any
 responsibilities
that
come
with
such
a
significant
political
power
fall
disproportionately
 on
each
member
of
that
privileged,
dominant
group.
We
can
see
vividly
how
members
 of
 the
 dominant
 group
 are
 uniquely
 well‐placed
 to
 assuage
 the
 stigmatisation,
 if
 we
 consider
 the
 differential
 effects
 upon
 the
 sense
 of
 self‐respect
 of
 a
 beloved
 from
 the

    
    7
 subordinate
 group
 when
 confronted
 with
 a)
 the
 action,
 of
 a
 lover
 from
 the
 dominant
 group,
 informed
 by
 his
 sexual
 attraction
 to
 her,
 and
 b)
 the
 action,
 of
 a
 lover
 from
 the
 subordinate
 group,
 informed
 by
 his
 sexual
 attraction
 to
 her.
 Of
 the
 two,
 the
 former
 action
 has
 a
 much
 greater
 ability
 to
 fly
 in
 the
 face
 of
 any
 publicly
 affirmed
 social
 narrative
to
the
effect
that
the
properties
of
members
of
the
subordinate
group
are
not
 sufficiently
admirable
to
elicit
love
from
a
lover.6
 
 2. The
duty
to
introspect
 
 If
the
possessor
of
such
a
significant
political
power
is
to
wield
that
power
responsibly,
 he7
ought
to
reason
thus:
“My
individual
personal
choices
and
actions
are
a
function,
on
 the
 one
 hand,
 of
 my
 beliefs
 about
 how
 the
 world
 is
 and,
 on
 the
 other,
 of
 my
 desires,
 that
 is
 of
 my
 attractions
 and
 aversions
 to
 particular
 objects
 or
 people.
 If
 I
 have
 an
 aversion
to
a
type
of
people,
where
that
type
of
people
is,
or
has
been,
stigmatised
in

    6
    
    
We
should
construe
“membership
of
the
dominant
group”
broadly.
For
instance,
members
of
a
stigmatised
group
 who
 are
 otherwise
 members
 of
 some
 socially
 dominant
 group
 have
 special
 responsibilities
 towards
 those
 of
 their
 fellow
 stigmatised
 members
 who
 are
 otherwise
 stigmatised,
 independently
 of
 their
 membership
 in
 that
 group.
 An
 example
 of
 this
 is
 the
 case
 of
 the
 stigmatisation
 of
 gay
 men
 of
 colour.
 For,
 whereas
 white
 gay
 men
 share
 with
 gay
 men
of
colour
a
social
stigma
owing
to
their
common
pursuit
of
sexual
relations
with
people
of
their
own
sex,
white
 gay
 men
 are
 nevertheless
 members
 of
 the
 dominant
 social
 group
 of
 white
 people
 and,
 for
 that
 reason,
 enjoy
 a

 publicly
affirmed
social
narrative
that
the
properties
of
white
–
but
not
black
–
people
are
sufficiently
admirable
to
 elicit
love
from
a
lover.
These
two
facts
suggest
that
gay
men
of
colour
constitute
a
stigmatised
group,
subordinate
 both
 to
 white
 gay
 men,
 and
 to
 white
 heterosexuals
 and
 lesbian
 women.
 Given
 that
 gay
 men
 of
 colour
 are
 sexually
 oriented
 to
 men,
 those
 most
 able
 to
 assuage
 the
 stigmatisation
 of
 gay
 men
 of
 colour
 just
 happen
 to
 be
 white
 gay
 men.
Thus
the
responsibility
to
introspect
and,
if
necessary,
to
divest,
falls
disproportionately
upon
white
gay
men.
 
 7 
 Who
 is
 “he”?
 This
 argument
 is
 addressed
 both
 to
 the
 egalitarian
 and
 to
 the
 anti‐egalitarian.
 Unlike
 other
 philosophers,
I
am
uninterested
in
the
inconsistency
of
egalitarians
who
advocate
ethnic
equality
in
the
public
sphere,
 while
permitting
ethnicised
sexual
preferences
in
the
in
the
private
sphere,
all
the
while
acknowledging
that
events
in
 private
 sphere
 are
 more
 crucial
 to
 a
 person’s
sense
of
self‐respect
than
events
in
 the
public
sphere
 (Thomas
1999:
 195‐6).
 I
 agree
 that
 such
 an
 inconsistency
 is
 suspect
 (indeed,
 it
 is
 difficult,
 to
 see
 how
 it
 is
 possible
 to
 prevent
 preferences
of
the
private
sphere
from
influencing
–
albeit
unconsciously
–
decisions
made
in
the
public
sphere,
cf.
 Thomas
1999:
197).
However,
mine
is
no
ad hominem
criticism
of
inconsistency:
I
am
interested
in
moral
failings
in
 the
private
sphere
of
which
even
anti‐egalitarians
could
fall
foul.
 

    
    8
 my
society,
my
personal
choices
are
liable
to
be
a
function
of
that
sexual
aversion.
If
my
 personal
choices
are
liable
to
be
a
function
of
such
a
sexual
aversion,
I
am
liable,
in
my
 actions,
 to
 maintain,
 aggravate,
 or
 rekindle
 stigmatisation
 in
 my
 society.
 It
 would
 be
 wrong
to
maintain,
aggravate,
or
rekindle
stigmatisation
in
my
society.
However,
I
will
 not
know
whether
or
not
I
have
such
a
sexual
aversion
unless
I
have
introspected,
i.e.
 submitted
my
own
sexual
aversions
to
scrutiny.
Therefore,
I
should
introspect.”
 
 One
 might
 object
 that
 either
 the
 nature  or
 the
 origin  of
 sexual
 preferences
 renders
 them
inscrutable
via
introspection,
such
that
they
do
not
admit
of
justification.
First,
in
 its
 nature,
 claims
 Hume,
 “a
 passion
 is
 an
 original
 existence”
 and,
 unlike
 a
 cognition,
 “contains
 not
 any
 representative
 quality”
 (THN
 2.3.3.5).
 This
 leads
 Hume
 to
 conclude
 that,
 “where
 a
 passion
 is
 neither
 founded
 on
 false
 suppositions,
 nor
 chuses
 means
 insufficient
 for
 the
 end,
 the
 understanding
 can
 neither
 justify
 not
 condemn
 it”
 (THN,
 2.3.3.6).
It
may
be
further
claimed
that
cases,
such
as
those
involving
sexual
attraction
 to
 children,
 where
 sexual
 preferences
 seem
 to
 admit
 of
 condemnation
 are
 more
 reasonably
 understood
 as
 cases
 where
 it
 is
 not
 the
 preference
 that
 admits
 of
 condemnation,
 but
 rather
 its
 exercise.
 The
 exercise
 of
 the
 preference
 harms
 children,
 whereas
one’s
merely
having
that
preference
does
not
(Matravers
2008).
However,
this
 theory
 of
 the
 nature
 of
 passion
 cannot
 impugn
 the
 duty
 to
 introspect,
 for
 that
 duty
 enjoins
the
scrutiny
of
aversions
insofar as they are liable to inform action.
If
one
can
be
 sure
 that
 a
 sexual
 aversion
 one
 has
 will
 not
 inform
 one’s
 action,
 then
 one
 need
 not
 introspect.
Of
course,
it
is
highly
unlikely
that
one
could
ever
be
sure
of
that.


    
    9
 
 Second,
one
might
claim
that,
since,
in
their
origin,
they
are
“brute”,
“sheer”,
or
“not
up
 to
us”,
sexual
preferences
do
not
admit
of
justification
or
condemnation.
However,
first,
 the
mere
fact
that
sexual
preferences
are
unchosen
does
not
mean
that
they
cannot
be
 rejected
or
changed.
Second,
it
would
seem
that
the
sort
of
sexual
aversions
we
have
 been
 discussing
 thus
 far
 are
 not
 brute,
 as
 in
 naturally‐occurring,
 but
 are
 rather
 constructions
of
the
society
in
which
the
agent
has
developed.
For
instance,
ethnicised
 preferences
about
the
people
with
whom
one
would
like
to
be
physically
intimate
are
 social
constructions.
We
can
see
this
from
the
fact
that
infants
do
not
respond
to
love
 only
from
persons
of
a
particular
ethnicity
(Thomas
1999:
190).
Third,
it
is
not
clear
that
 we
really
do
value
love
that
is
elicited
in
virtue
of
brute,
inexplicable
preferences
alone.
 For,
while
“my
aversions
are
not
up
to
me”
may
seem
an
acceptable
response
in
reply
to
 the
 non‐beloved’s
 criticism
 of
 the
 would‐be
 lover’s
 sexual
 aversions
 to
 her,
 “my
 attractions
 are
 not
 up
 to
 me”
 does
 not,
 by
 contrast,
 seem
 an
 acceptable
 response
 in
 reply
 to
 the
 beloved’s
 request
 for
 explanation
 of
 her
 lover’s
 sexual
 attractions
 to
 her.
 For,
 as
 we
 noted
 earlier,
 the
 benign
 sexual
 attraction
 another
 person
 has
 to
 us
 only
 grounds
our
sense
of
self
respect
if
that
other
person
is
attracted
to
us
in
virtue
of
an
 admirable
property
we
possess.
The
beloved
wants
to
know
that
she
is
loved
in
virtue
of
 a
specific
property
of
hers
that
she
values
and
that
her
lover
also
values
–
not
that
she
is
 loved
in
virtue
of
a
fluke
of
luck
in
just
happening
to
be
the
person
that
the
lover,
with
 his
sheer
preferences,
loves
(cf.
Soble
1990:
145‐6).
So
to
claim
that
the
unchosen
origin
 of
 sexual
 preferences
 renders
 them
 above
 justification
 is
 to
 undermine
 the
 ability
 of

    
    10
 love
to
ground
the
self‐respect
of
the
beloved.
 
 3. The
duty
to
divest
 
 Suppose
 a
 member
 of
 a
 dominant
 group,
 after
 a
 period
 of
 introspection,
 discovers
 himself
to
have
a
sexual
aversion
to
members
of
some
stigmatised
subordinate
group.
 What
ought
he
to
do?
In
order
to
answer
this
question,
take,
as
a
case
study,
a
white,
 able‐bodied
 man
 in
 the
 context
 of
 the
 unjust
 social
 hierarchies
 of
 male
 dominance,
 white
 supremacy,
 and
 able‐bodied
 privilege.
 In
 this
 man’s
 society,
 fat
 women,
 black
 people
 and
 disabled
 people
 are
 or
 have
 been
 unjustly
 represented
 as
 being
 objects
 worthy
of
the
attitude
of
aversion.
Against
the
background
of
this
society
where
women
 are
prized
for
being
slim,
he
has
a
sexual
aversion
to
women
of
a
fuller
figure.
Against
 the
 background
 of
 a
 mass
 media
 dominated
 by
 favourable
 representations
 of
 white
 people,
 he
 has
 a
 sexual
 aversion
 to
 black
 people.
 Against
 the
 background
 of
 the
 infrequent
accommodation
of
the
disabled
in
public
life,
he
has
a
sexual
aversion
to
the
 physically
disabled.
Suppose
that
this
white,
able‐bodied
man
dutifully
introspects
and
 finds
himself
to
have
these
three
sexual
aversions.
How
should
he
reason?
 
 He
 ought
 to
 reason
 thus:
 “I
 know
 that
 my
 choices
 and
 actions
 are
 a
 function
 of
 the
 aversions
 that
 I
 have.
 I
 know
 also
 that,
 if
 I
 have
 sexual
 aversions
 to
 fat
 women,
 black
 people,
and
disabled
people,
my
actions
are
more
likely
than
not
going
to
be
a
function
 of
 those
 aversions.
 For,
 in
 a
 society
 with
 a
 history
 of
 stigmatisation
 of
 certain
 social

    
    11
 groups,
or,
still
more
pressing,
in
which
certain
social
groups
are
currently
stigmatised,
it
 is
reasonable
to
presume
that
any
sexual
aversion
to
members
of
a
subordinate
group
 one
does
have
is
more
likely
than
not
going
to
maintain
or
aggravate
existing
trends
or
 to
 rekindle
 historical
 trends
 of
 stigmatisation.
 Given
 the
 unconscious
 manner
 in
 which
 social
 norms
 of
 ethnic
 stigmatisation
 persist
 in
 the
 wake
 of
 the
 repeal
 of
 ethnically
 stigmatising
 legislation,
 this
 presumption
 seems
 well
 justified
 indeed.
 Thus,
 if
 I
 retain
 these
sexual
aversions,
my
actions
are
more
likely
than
not
going
to
maintain,
aggravate
 or
rekindle
stigmatisation.
Since
it
is
a
grave
wrong
to
maintain,
aggravate,
or
rekindle
 stigmatisation,
 I
 ought
 to
 divest
 myself
 of
 these
 sexual
 aversions
 to
 fat
 women,
 black
 people,
and
disabled
people.”
 
 First,
 one
 might
 object
 that
 the
 only
 way
 to
 create
 a
 scenario
 where
 members
 of
 the
 dominant
 group,
 previously
 sexually
 averse
 to
 members
 of
 the
 subordinate
 group,
 choose
 members
 of
 the
 subordinate
 group
 as
 sexual
 partners,
 is
 to
 enjoin
 those
 dominant
 group
 members
 to
 cultivate
 a
 sexual
 attraction
 to
 members
 of
 the
 subordinate
 group.
 This
 would
 be
 a
 problem
 because
 sexual
 attractions
 consciously
 adopted,
 especially
 through
 a
 sense
 of
 duty,
 destroy
 the
 true
 meaning
 of
 affection.
 However,
 I
 have
 not
 hitherto
 argued
 for
 any
 conclusion
 about
 what
 our
 sexual
 attractions
 should
 be.8
 Moreover,
 the
 suggestion
 that
 the
 deliberate
 and
 reflective

    8
    
    
Unlike
Thomas,
who
claims
that
“no
ethnic
kind
should
be
privileged
[in
sexual
preference]
as
a
matter
of
principle”
 (1999:198).
By
contrast,
I
believe
that
so
long
as
such
a
blanket
rule
does
not
maintain
or
aggravate
an
existing
trend
 of
stigmatisation
in
society,
this
is
morally
innocuous.
My
position
is
preferable
since
it
permits,
for
instance,
a
black
 person’s
exclusive
sexual
preference
for
other
black
people.
It
also
allows
for
a
blanket
rule
on
the
sex
of
the
person
 that
 one
 will
 consider
 as
 a
 sexual
 partner.
 It
 allows
 for
 gay
 men
 to
 privilege
 men
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 principle
 and
 for
 lesbian
 women
 to
 privilege
 women
 as
 a
 matter
 of
 principle.
 However,
 it
 also
 requires
 heterosexuals
 to
 think
 twice
 before
they
privilege
members
of
the
opposite
sex
–
which
is
probably
as
it
should
be,
if
members
of
the
dominant

    
    12
 adoption
of
sexual
preferences
is
illegitimate
mistakes
what
it
is
about
certain
sources
 of
 sexual
 preference
 that
 seems
 to
 render
 them
 illegitimate.
 Rather
 than
 contrast
 deliberately
 adopted
 preferences
 with
 preferences
 we
 “find”
 ourselves
 to
 have,
 we
 should
contrast
artificially
formed
preferences
with
preferences
formed
autonomously
 and
not
imposed
by
an
external
influence.9
This
latter
distinction
helps
to
explain
why
 the
nagging
beloved
we
saw
earlier
would
not
be
satisfied
by
the
reply
“because
society
 constructed
 me
 to
 love
 you”.
 It
 also
 explains
 why
 we
 deem
 illegitimate
 those
 sexual
 preferences
that
have
been
induced
in
a
lover
as
a
result
of
his
drinking
a
love
potion
–
 they
 have
 been
 artificially
 formed,
 and
 so
 don’t
 count.
 Furthermore,
 we
 think
 that
 aversions
that
are
consciously
adopted,
such
as
a
sexual
aversion
to
people
who
are
HIV
 positive,
 are
 acceptable.10
 So
 why
 would
 we
 not
 similarly
 think
 that
 sexual
 attractions

    
    group
are
to
be
duly
vigilant
about
the
way
in
which
they
wield
the
political
power
that
they
have
in
virtue
of
their
 membership
of
that
dominant
group.

 
 9 
 Soble
 identifies
 three
 criteria
 that,
 together,
 justify
 “x’s
 special
 concern
 for
 y”,
 these
 are
 the
 “requirements
 for
 avoiding
 defective,
 shallow
 love”:
 first,
 “x
 loves
 y
 in
 virtue
 of
 properties….that
 x
 finds
 valuable
 as
 a
 result
 of
 x’s
 autonomously
formed
preferences”;
second,
“x
loves
y
in
virtue
of
properties
that
are
not
superficial”;
and,
third,
“x’s
 belief
that
y
has
[the
properties
in
question]
is…well
founded
on
the
evidence”
Soble
1990:
283.
 
 10 
A
sexual
aversion
of
someone
who
is
HIV
negative
to
people
who
are
HIV
positive
provides
an
interesting
contrast
 to
a
sexual
aversion
of
someone
who
is
white
to
people
who
are
black.
For
a
sexual
aversion
to
black
people
does
not,
 presumably,
begin
with
an
aversion
to
having
sex
with
a
black
person;
rather
does
it
begin
with
a
general
aversion
to
 being
 in
 the
company
 of
 a
 black
 person,
 or
 otherwise
interacting
with
 a
 black
 person,
and
 only
 derivatively
does
it
 present
as
the
more
particular
aversion
to
having
sex
with
a
black
person.
By
contrast,
an
aversion
to
people
who
are
 HIV
positive,
presumably
begins
with
the
particular
sexual
aversion
to
being
in
physically
intimate
(principally
sexual)
 contact
with
a
person
who
is
HIV
positive
–
i.e.
to
being
in
contact
sufficiently
intimate
to
enable
viral
transmission
–
 and,
only
derivatively,
does
it
become
the
more
general
aversion
to
hiring
or
letting
one’s
property
to
a
person
who
is
 HIV
positive.
It
might,
for
this
reason
seem
that
a
sexual
aversion
to
people
who
are
HIV
positive
is
more
justifiable,
 for
a
member
of
the
relevant
dominant
group,
than
is
a
sexual
aversion
to
black
people.

 
 However,
 we
 ought
 to
 distinguish
 a
 sexual
 aversion
 owing
 to
 the
 fear
 of
 viral
 transmission
 from
 a
 sexual
 aversion
 borne
of
the
more
general
societal
aversion
to
people
who
are
HIV
positive.
If
the
sexual
aversion
is
of
the
latter
type,
 then
it
seems
to
be
similar
to,
rather
than
to
contrast
with,
the
case
of
a
sexual
aversion
to
black
people,
and,
for
that
 reason,
to
be
an
injustice.
If,
alternatively,
the
sexual
aversion
is
of
the
former
type,
then
it
 could
well
be
justified.
 One
might
see
a
justifiable
reason
of
health
for
retaining,
as
someone
that
is
HIV
negative,
a
sexual
aversion
one
has
 to
 people
 who
 are
 HIV
 positive:
 one
 does
 not
 want
 to
 contract
 a
 potentially
 life‐threatening
 and,
 as
 yet,
 incurable
 viral
infection.
However,
it
not
obvious
that
this
reason
of
health
is
insurmountable.
For
there
are
intimate
physical
 acts
 someone
 that
 is
 HIV
 negative
 can
 perform
 with
 someone
 that
 is
 HIV
 positive
 that
 carry
 no
 risk
 of
 viral
 transmission
(e.g.
non‐penetrative
sex
that
does
not
involve
the
exchange
of
bodily
fluids),
and
there
are
still
other

    
    13
 consciously
adopted
are
acceptable?
 
 Second,
one
might
object
that,
if
a
white
person
divests
himself
of
a
sexual
aversion
to
 black
 people,
 yet
 continues
 to
 indulge
 his
 (otherwise
 innocuous)
 sexual
 attraction
 to
 white
 people,
 he
 may
 continue
 to
 reject
 black
 people
 as
 potential
 sexual
 partners.
 It
 may
 seem
 then
 that
 nothing
 has
 changed,
 and
 such
 a
 scenario
 could
 still
 detract
 significantly
from
the
sense
of
self‐respect
held
by
black
people.
Thus
the
mere
duty
to
 divest
is
not
sufficient
to
deconstruct
the
publicly
affirmed
narrative
that
black
people
 are
worthy
of
the
attitude
of
sexual
aversion.
However,
insofar
as
his
new
rejection
is
 grounded
in
indifference
as
opposed
to
aversion,
there
is
much
less
reason
for
the
black
 people
he
rejects
to
feel
diminished
in
their
sense
of
self‐respect.
Yet,
of
course,
there
is
 no
way
for
a
rejected
black
person
to
know
for
sure
that
her
rejection
was
grounded
in
 sexual
 indifference
 to
 people
 of
 her
 ethnicity
 as
 opposed
 to
 sexual
 aversion
 to
 them.
 Indeed,
were
every
white
person
with
a
sexual
aversion
to
black
people
to
divest
him
or
 herself
 of
 that
 aversion,
 replacing
 it
 with
 a
 sexual
 indifference
 to
 black
 people,
 this
 would
still
not
be
enough
to
eliminate
stigmatisation,
if,
because
they
each,
by
chance,
 continued
to
indulge
a
sexual
preference
for
white
people,
a
de facto
stigmatisation
of
 black
people
in
society
persisted.
In
such
a
scenario,
the
onus
would
be
on
white
people
 as
 a
 collective
 to
 prove
 that
 they
 do
 not
 continue
 to
 stigmatise
 black
 people,
 even
 though
no
white
person
ever
chooses
to
have
sex
with
a
black
person.

    acts
that
carry
a
low,
much
reduced,
risk
(e.g.
penetrative
sex
that
uses
condoms;
or,
where
no
condom
is
used,
that
 does
not
involve
the
exchange
of
bodily
fluids;
or,
if
it
does,
that
takes
place
with
a
partner
whose
HIV
viral
load
has
 been
reduced
to
an
undetectable
level
by
anti‐retroviral
treatment).
Once
the
threat
of
viral
transmission
is
removed,
 it
 is
 difficult
 to
 see
 what
 reason,
 beyond
 the
 desire
 to
 stigmatise,
 a
 person
 who
 is
 HIV
 negative
 might
 have
 for
 retaining
a
sexual
aversion
to
people
who
are
HIV
positive.

    
    14
 
 Third,
one
might
object
that
either
of
the
following
two
duties
requires
the
impossible:
 a)
 the
 duty
 just
 mentioned
 of
 a
 white
 person,
 who
 has
 already
 divested
 himself
 of
 a
 sexual
aversion
to
black
people,
to
persuade
rejected
black
people
that
he
rejects
them
 only
from
an
attitude
of
indifference,
or
b)
the
duty
of
a
white
person
to
divest
himself
 of
 a
 sexual
 aversion
 to
 black
 people.
 For,
 with
 regards
 to
 the
 former,
 it
 would
 seem
 unfair
to
accuse
a
single
white
person
of
not
really
having
divested
himself
of
such
an
 aversion,
 simply
 because
 we
 remarked
 that
 a
 de  facto
 stigmatisation
 of
 black
 people
 persisted.

With
regards
to
the
latter,
changing
our
desires
may
be
beyond
our
ability.
If
 "ought"
implies
"can",
then
neither
of
these
can
be
a
duty,
it
is
claimed,
owing
to
the
 significant
 limits
 on
 what
 an
 individual
 –
 albeit
 well‐intentioned
 –
 member
 of
 the
 dominant
 group
 can
 achieve,
 especially
 after
 having
 been
 socialized
 to
 hold
 the
 associated
 beliefs
 and
 feel
 the
 associated
 emotions
 that
 the
 phenomenon
 of
 stigmatisation
 requires
 of
 him.
 On
 his
 own,
 he
 will
 not
 be
 able
 to
 overcome
 this
 socialization
and
fulfil
the
duties
in
question.
However,
since
stigmatisation
is
a
matter
 of
shared
norms
and
ideas,
we
do
not
expect
him
to
perform
the
divestiture
as
a
solo
 surgeon
or
to
inspire
confidence
among
black
people
as
an
independent
public
relations
 executive.
No,
he
has
a
claim
against
the
society
that
socialized
him
(such
that
he
play
 his
role
in
the
phenomenon
of
stigmatisation)
that
the
rest
of
society
work
with
him
as
 assistants
in
this
surgery
and
publicity
(cf.
Soble
1990:
282‐83).
What
one
person
cannot
 do
on
his
own,
many
people
might
be
able
to
do
collectively;
and
this
well‐intentioned
 member
 of
 the
 dominant
 group
 has
 a
 right
 that
 his
 fellow
 socialized
 citizens
 aid
 and

    
    15
 abet
him
in
this
collective
action.

 
 He
might
enjoin
his
fellows
to
make
such
an
effort
in
the
private
sphere,
in
civil
society,
 and
 in
 the
 political
 sphere.
 For
 example,
 he
 might
 enjoin
 them
 to
 create
 a
 family
 environment
where
they
raise
their
children
to
subject
to
special
scrutiny
any
aversion
 they
 might
 come
 across
 or
 find
 in
 themselves
 towards
 members
 of
 historically
 or
 currently
stigmatised
types
of
people.
We
may
enjoin
them
to
dare
to
frown
on
a
racist
 joke
 that
 may
 be
 told
 in
 a
 familial
 setting.
 The
 stakes
 are
 lower
 than
 those
 in
 a
 non‐ familial
setting,
for
the
bonds
of
familial
love
can
usually
be
expected
to
overcome
the
 friction
that
such
a
frowning‐upon
might
generate.
In
civil
society,
he
might
enjoin
his
 fellows
 to
 represent
 in
 art,
 especially
 in
 the
 more
 popular
 forms,
 such
 as
 cinema
 and
 television,
and
in
mass
media,
especially
in
the
more
penetrating
forms,
such
as
news
 journalism
 and
 capitalist
 advertising,
 members
 of
 historically
 or
 currently
 stigmatised
 types
 of
 people
 in
 a
 novel,
 favourable
 light.
 Finally,
 in
 the
 political
 sphere,
 he
 might
 enjoin
 his
 fellows
 to
 execute
 policies
 of
 socio‐economic
 redistribution,
 to
 give
 a
 concrete
 backbone
 to
 the
 new,
 favourable
 representations
 of
 formerly
 stigmatised
 people
that
will,
by
now,
be
circulating
in
society.
The
burden
of
the
political
power
of
 sexual
preference
on
the
individual
member
of
a
dominant
social
group
is
great
indeed.
 However,
in
his
fellow
socialized
citizens,
he
has
a
resource
that
will
enable
him
to
wield
 that
power
wisely.
And
he
has
a
right
to
expect
his
fellows
to
help
him.

    
 
 
 
 

    
    16

    References
 HUME,
David.
A
treatise
on
human
nature
 MACKINNON,
Catherine.
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (Yale
University
Press,
 1979)
 th MATRAVERS,
Derek.
“Ethics
and
sexual
desire,”
presentation
to
Sexual
ethics
workshop,
University
of
Bristol,
9 
May
 2008.
 RAWLS,
John.
A theory of justice
(Harvard
University
Press,
1999)
 SOBLE,
Alan.
The structure of love (Yale
University
Press,
1990)
 THOMAS,
 Laurence.
 “Split‐level
 equality:
 Mixing
 love
 and
 equality,”
 in
 S.
 Babbit
 and
 S.
 Campbell
 eds.
 Racism  and  philosophy
(Cornell
University
Press,
1999)


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